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case of a rural boy’s family tradition of carrying knives, passed down from father
to son ð2 and 93Þ. He says knife carrying for the rural boy is a matter of his
“identity as a man in his community” ð2Þ, which will be destroyed if his ability to
carry his knife is abridged ð2–3Þ. Maybe the case is set up by stipulation to be
exactly identical with the case of the Sikh boy so far as the implication of religious obligation with “a unique sense of individual and personal identity” is concerned ð32Þ. But that stipulation may be uninteresting if it does not characterize
any real cases or if cases of religious identity have features that distinguish them in
various ways—important as matters of concern or fairness—from secular identity.
The difficulty here is that Leiter has more or less ruled out any exploration of the
distinctiveness of religious identity, by saying early on that an identity element
should not be included in the definition of religion because identity can be
formed in other ways ð32–33Þ.
This is a poorly organized book, and it does not really present any wellstructured arguments. In a blurb on the back of the book, Christopher Eisgruber
says that “every serious scholar of religious toleration will have to contend with
Leiter’s bold claims.” That would have been so if Leiter had proceeded less precipitously to the question that interests him and then focused on it more steadily—
if, for example, he had first identified the classic arguments for toleration and criticized them and had then gone on to argue that neither the classic tolerationist
arguments ðsuch as they areÞ nor any other principled arguments can make a case
for religious accommodations. That would have been a bold and bracing argument. But poor structure and lack of clarity with definitions make it harder to
see what is at stake in any of the arguments and what position exactly Leiter is counselling us to take.
Jeremy Waldron
New York University School of Law and All Souls College, Oxford

Niederberger, Andreas, and Schink, Philipp, eds. Republican Democracy: Liberty,
Law and Politics.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013. Pp. 344. $120.00 ðclothÞ.
There’s been enough renewed interest in republicanism over the past thirty
years that we can call it a “republican revival.” If you know about this revival, it’s
probably through the Quentin Skinner cum Philip Pettit excavation of a third way
between Isaiah Berlin’s conceptions of negative and positive freedom. For republicans, Skinner and Pettit tell us, freedom is ðor at least requiresÞ nondomination.
Living without domination requires neither the absence of interference nor the
actualization of ideals associated with positive liberty—autonomy, self-mastery, and
so on. Suppose I want to drink less, but I just can’t sober up. So I hand over my liquor cabinet’s key to a friend, on the understanding that she will only return it after
a day’s notice. This is one of Pettit’s favorite examples. He thinks it shows how interference doesn’t always compromise freedom. If I beg you for the immediate return of my key, and you refuse as per my instructions, you interfere with me, but
you don’t reduce my freedom because you interfere on my terms. Interference
makes me less free only when it isn’t on my terms—such interference is “arbitrary”
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as republicans often say. Arbitrary interference always reduces freedom. Suppose you stole the key in hopes of helping me overcome alcoholism. Your actions
might lead to increased self-mastery, but you left me worse off in a freedom-specific
way nonetheless.
Pettit thinks that a robust commitment to democracy falls right out of this
conception of freedom. The republican tradition rejects outright William Paley’s
claim that life under “the edicts of a despotic prince” might be “no less free than
the purest democracy” ðThe Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy [Indianapolis:
Liberty Fund, 2002], 314Þ. Why? Because however religiously they leave us alone,
despotic princes hold a power of arbitrary interference. The promise of democracy,
from a republican perspective like Pettit’s, is that a democratic regime is one where
the state interferes only as bidden by the people. He claims that there is thus a deep,
maybe even conceptual, connection between republicanism and democracy.
If Andreas Niederberger and Philipp Schink’s Republican Democracy has a
signal virtue, it’s this: the essays assembled here collectively demonstrate how
problematic Pettit’s claim is in light of history’s republicanisms and how much
theoretical spadework remains to be done to substantiate it. The fact is that history’s republicans have often looked askance at democratic politics. The will of
the people, for many in the tradition, is just another potentially despotic will.
Better not to be ruled by people. Better to be ruled by law. Given this checkered
history with regard to popular rule, those of us who agree with Pettit that democratizing republicanism is a worthy endeavor will benefit from a hard look
at why the tradition has often disagreed. Several of the essays in Republican Democracy provide light for such hard looking, in particular, those from Marco
Geuna, Jack Rakove, John Ferejohn, and Pettit himself. Rainer Forst, Philipp
Schink, Galya Benarieh Ruffer, and Ralph Bellamy provide further theoretical
resources and possible course corrections for the democratization project. Three
essays—James Bohman’s, Cécile Laborde’s, and Niederberger’s—examine the
prospects for a democratized republicanism at the international level. One essay—John McCormick’s—argues that democratizing the republican tradition is
a fool’s errand.
This taxonomy of Republican Democracy is not quite identical to the editors’.
Here’s why. As Niederberger and Schink point out in their introduction, the
history of republicanism is a history of republicanisms: “there is no unified school
of republican political thought” ð1Þ. Unfortunately, if you come to Republican
Democracy without at least a working knowledge of the particular histories of republicanism’s disunified schools, you may not be well served reading the essays
in the order you find them. The editors officially delegate historical exposition
to the anthology’s first three essays: Geuna’s “The Tension between Law and
Politics in the Modern Republican Tradition,” Rakove’s “Impotence, Perspicuity
and the Rule of Law: James Madison’s Critique of Republican Legislation,” and
Bohman’s “Kant, Madison and the Problem of Transnational Order: Popular
Sovereignty in Multilevel Systems.” Even so, to my mind, the most general and
accessible introduction to the history of republicanism here is Ferejohn’s “Two
Views of the City: Republicanism and Law.” Some readers might do well to start
here instead of with the essays officially tagged “historical” by the editors.
It is difficult to extract a common core from the republican tradition, but
Ferejohn’s emphasis on two particular claims is probably the way to go: ðiÞ there
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is such a thing as “the public interest” or “the common good,” and ðiiÞ government must be restrained so that it pursues the common good, and only the
common good. Ferejohn unwinds the “classical” and “modern” strands of republicanism from different understandings of these two ideas. For classical republicans, the common good must be forged from the perpetual striving of popular versus aristocratic interests; modern republicans reject the idea that there
is any such thing as a perpetual division among class interests. Instead, modern republicans adopt the social ontology usually associated with liberalism: the
common good is worked up from the interests of citizens qua individuals, not
qua proles or qua plebs. The varied institutional recommendations generated
on either side of this classical/modern divide are a function, Ferejohn argues, of
what different republicans regard as the common good’s primary competitor.
The interest of a dictator? The mob? The aristos? This is among the anthology’s
most helpful interpretive insights, particularly because republican attitudes toward democracy usually turn precisely on whether they regard “the people” as
the primary guardian or the primary threat to the common good.
On Ferejohn’s way of dividing the field, most Italian-Atlantic republicans
should be dubbed “classical,” while contemporary republicans like Pettit who
identify with the Italian-Atlantic tradition should be grouped with the “moderns”
along with Franco-German republicanism. Pettit’s link to the Italian-Atlantic
tradition, and what divides him from fellow modern republicans like Rousseau
and Kant, is his understanding of the institutional arrangements that best minimize domination. The contrast between Italian-Atlantic and Franco-German republicanism is the theme of Pettit’s own contribution: “Two Republican Traditions.” Here, he traces Bodin’s and Hobbes’s metaphysics of sovereignty through
to Rousseau’s and Kant’s rejection of the Italian-Atlantic claim that a mixed constitution, with avenues of access for a “contestatory” citizenry, is necessary to realize
nondomination. Of course, for Rousseau and Kant, the monarchial sovereign favored by Bodin and Hobbes is replaced by a sovereign people, but the metaphysics
remains. Sovereignty, though relocated, is no less indivisible, unitary, and absolute
for Rousseau and Kant, thus their rejection of Italian-Atlantic institution recommendations. If sovereignty is indivisible and unitary, it cannot be distributed across various “branches” of government; if popular sovereignty is absolute, there is no place
for legitimate contestation. The rejection of this element of Kant’s republicanism in
favor of James Madison’s doctrines of distributed popular sovereignty is the primary historical element of Bohman’s essay, which is otherwise given over to applying Madisonian innovations to the problems of multilevel systems like the European Union. Given that Pettit’s analysis of Kant is the more accessible of the two,
I recommend reading Pettit first or saving Bohman to be read in conjunction
with Laborde and Niederberger, who share his cosmopolitan focus.
It is not quite right to say, as the editors seem to in their introduction, that
Pettit’s essay defends his own neorepublicanism against populist and Kantian
criticisms from fellow contributors to Republican Democracy. The specifically Kantian criticism he faces here—in Forst’s sketch of a “Kantian Republican Conception
of Justice as Nondomination”—has nothing much to do with the Kantian doctrines
Pettit opposes in “Two Republican Traditions.” In fact, the most recent iterations
of Pettit’s republicanism move him close to Forst on certain fronts. For example,
the second chapter of Pettit’s On the People’s Terms is at least an attempt to agree
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with Forst that republicanism does indeed “imply a notion of justice with respect
to a basic social and political structure” ð154Þ, and the conception of justice Pettit
develops there shares Forst’s “status, not goods” emphasis. Ironically, given Pettit’s
devotion to the Italian-Atlantics, the populist opposition arrayed against him here
is more Machiavellian than Rousseauian. Marco Geuna’s essay introduces this additional fault line within the Italian-Atlantic tradition, with Machiavelli as primary representative of populist republicanism against aristocratic alternatives.
John McCormick goes much further. He argues that Machiavelli is a “self-avowed
dissenter from the republican tradition” ð121Þ and that Italian-Atlantic republicanism, up to and including Pettit’s variety, is irreducibly elitist and antidemocratic.
Now, there’s evidence in Pettit’s latter-day work that he takes McCormick’s criticisms
very seriously. In On the People’s Terms, Pettit explicitly claims that his project is congenial to more radically democratic theories like McCormick’s. Unfortunately,
McCormick does not directly consider any of Pettit’s work after 2004’s “Depoliticizing Democracy.” It would have been interesting to see McCormick engage
more recent material.
While McCormick takes Pettit to task for not endorsing more robust forms
of popular control, his other primary critic in Republican Democracy—Schink in
“Freedom, Control, and the State”—mounts a general critique of the role control plays in Pettit’s recent work. As noted above, Pettit leans heavily on examples
like that of the sobriety - assisting friend to show how interference is consistent
with nondomination, and so with freedom. Schink’s essay begins by reminding us
that Pettit wants to use something like the same mechanism to show how the interference of an active republican state is consistent with, and in fact constitutes,
the freedom of that state’s citizens. The final three chapters of On the People’s Terms
are an extended argument for the claim that the interference of such a state might
be no more a source of domination than the interference of the sobriety-assisting
friend. For the argument to go through, the control exercised by the recovering
alcoholic must have a direct analog in the people’s control of the republican state.
Of course, Pettit acknowledges that the analogy is imperfect—perhaps most importantly, whatever control individual citizens exercise must be reconciled with the
equal right of fellow citizens to control the state. Even so, Schink’s arguments that
not enough of the analogy remains to connect Pettit’s conception of nondomination with his vision of a nondominating state are generally persuasive. In sum, both
McCormick’s and Schink’s contributions seem to me to ask Pettit precisely the
right questions, whether or not we conclude that his republicanism in its current
form has the resources to answer them.
So, Republican Democracy shows us a republicanism divided along several
fronts: classical versus modern, populist versus aristocratic, Franco-German versus Italian-Atlantic. The editors produce yet another, and perhaps the most interesting, division as they push republicanism away from liberalism—the rival in
opposition to which the “revival” has always defined itself. The essential republican critique of liberalism, say Niederberger and Schink in the introduction, is
that “such a normative program is oblivious to the political and legal conditions
necessary for peaceful, free, just and democratic coexistence” ð1Þ. This will probably strike some readers as an odd remark. After all, you might think the search
for such conditions is the obsession of late Rawlsian political theory, paradigmatic
liberalism though it is. We have to wait until Niederberger’s essay—the last in the
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anthology—for a better idea of what they might have in mind. The essential difference between republicanism and liberalism, he says here, is that for the latter
and not for the former “½the theoretical justification of normative claims often
precedes the question of their realization, or, to put it another way, their justification is distinct in a way that it retains a critical capacity even where the normative claims have seemingly been put in to practice: Their theoretical justification can thus never be fully contained in their practical realization.” Whereas for
the republicanism he seems to favor, “½Normative claims are inextricably linked
to the way they are put into practice in structures or institutions. Thus, the way in
which claims are realized is in itself essential when it comes to justifying claims”
ð306–7Þ.
The idea seems to be that liberalism does, and republicanism doesn’t, allow for what we might call pre- or extrainstitutional normative claims. For republicanism, on this reckoning, what Forst calls a “right to justification” is exhausted by the presence of legitimate institutions; for liberals, it remains in force
even in that context. Now, I’m not concerned here with the fairness of this assessment of liberalism. What interests me is its merits as an assessment of republicanism. By my reckoning, a significant swath of the republican tradition is
on the liberal side of the divide sketched by Niederberger here. Pettit is a prime
example. While he certainly would agree that nondomination cannot be instituted extrainstitutionally, he allows domination complaints to have traction even
within a suitably democratic, republican commonwealth. Madison’s warning,
quoted at the end of Rakove’s essay, has a similar spirit: “wherever” we find “the
real power” a threat to republican liberty remains, even if “the real power lies in
the majority of the Community” ð58Þ.
Whether or not Niederberger is correct that rejecting extrainstitutional normative claims is essentially republican, Ruffer and Bellamy argue that such rejection is an essential feature of the best republicanism. Ruffer claims that a “courageous” citizenry will have a “mature skepticism” about preinstitutional rights;
Bellamy goes so far as to say that the idea of a right “outside of any polity” that could
constrain democratic politics is “both unjustifiable and incoherent” ð253–54Þ. His
argument for this turns centrally on the idea that specifying and applying rightsbased claims requires democratic forums. I’m inclined to agree with Bellamy about
this, as will many contemporary republicans, but to say that such forums are required in this way does not show that there are no rights without them. And what
about each individual’s claim against domination? Bellamy maintains that all of us
have a legitimate claim to “inclusion as a political equal within the decision-making
processes of those powerful bodies capable of exercising domination over our lives”
ð363Þ. Why not call this claim on inclusion a right. If it is a right, and a right held
by individuals over even ðinternallyÞ democratic bodies, should we not regard it as
in some sense extrainstitutional and even prepolitical? For those who think we
should, a more liberal variety of republicanism remains an attractive alternative.
The anthology concludes with two essays in the cause of republican cosmopolitanism: Laborde’s “Republicanism and Global Justice: A Sketch” and
Niederberger’s “Republicanism and Transnational Democracy.” Laborde demonstrates—I believe conclusively—that long-standing worries about the adaptability
of republican concerns to problems of international justice are ill founded. Niederberger joins Bohman in pressing the need to abandon world-state models of
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cosmopolitanism. With Bohman, he presses the instability of a republicanism that
tries to confine its applications to the relation of traditional states and their citizens. He differs from Bohman primarily in what form he thinks those applications should take. While Bohman thinks the best bet for realizing nondomination across national boundaries involves the expansion of the deliberative
democratic model, Niederberger looks to something more like an international
judiciary. Both are rather frustratingly abstract in their institutional recommendations, but this is forgivable given the ground-level nature of both essays.
A recurring theme of Republican Democracy is that bounded civic conflict is necessary to a flourishing republican polity. Perhaps. What’s certainly true is that a
flourishing republican revival, especially one with vibrant populist ambitions, must
come to terms with the tradition’s internal conflicts about the value and form of
democratic rule. That all sides of this conflict are generating interesting work, as
manifest in this anthology, is a good sign of the tradition’s health.
Christopher McCammon
University of Nebraska–Lincoln

Persson, Ingmar. From Morality to the End of Reason: An Essay on Rights, Reasons, and
Responsibility.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 336. $55.00 ðclothÞ.
From Morality to the End of Reason is an ambitious book. Ingmar Persson tackles
key issues from across the spectrum of ethical theory and beyond: the nature of
rights, self-ownership, killing and letting die, the doctrine of double effect, collective action, freedom and moral responsibility, and the nature and ground of
practical and epistemic reasons. His conclusions on these wide-ranging issues
are woven into an overarching view of morality and rationality.
Persson argues that key parts of commonsense morality depend on the DNR
ðdoctrine of negative rightsÞ and CBR ðcausally-based responsibilityÞ. The DNR
states that we have general rights to noninterference but no general rights to
positive aid ð1Þ. The CBR is a conception of responsibility on which the greater
the causal contribution an agent makes to an outcome, the greater her responsibility for it ð1Þ. Persson argues that both the DNR and the CBR are untenable
and must be discarded ð48–69, 69–159Þ. The CBR should be replaced with an
alternative understanding of responsibility. On this alternative understanding,
“the practical reasons-based conception of responsibility,” we are responsible for
the outcomes of practical deliberation ð166 –75Þ. According to Persson, as DNR
and CBR underpin both the AOD ðact-omission distinctionÞ and the DDE ðdoctrine of double effectÞ, rejecting these elements of commonsense morality leads
to a symmetrical morality on which aiding is as important as avoiding harm ð69–
94, 140–59Þ. This new morality is based on reasons of beneficence rather than
reasons of right ð160–66Þ. It is far more demanding than commonsense morality
ð165Þ. Compliance with a more demanding morality is needed if we are to deal
with the most serious moral challenges of the twenty-first century: poverty and
disease in the developing world and anthropogenic climate change ð302Þ. Unfortunately, reasons of beneficence are understood to be weaker than reasons of

